6 October 2025
DIGISOV research seminar 2025-2026

The ANR DIGISOV project, “Digital Governance and Sovereignty in a Fractured World: Competing States and the Circulation of Norms,” is continuing its series of research seminars for the 2025–2026 academic year. These seminars provide an opportunity to deepen our understanding of global issues in digital governance and to discuss questions of digital sovereignty—understood as dynamic processes of influence, competition, and imitation across various fields: digital markets, technological infrastructures, and the organization of the digital public sphere. Particular attention will be paid to the role and position of the State in establishing these new norms.

Presentations will be given in either French or English. Admission is free, and the sessions will take place at the EHESS, 54 bd Raspail, 75006 Paris and at the Institut de Droit Comparé, 28 rue Saint-Guillaume, 75007 Paris.

 

Seminar programme

Tuesday 14th October 2025 (10h30-12h30)
Room AS1_08 (underground) – 54 bd Raspail, 75006 Paris

Riccardo Nanni (postdoc DIGISOV, Centre Internet et Société/CNRS):

Current Trajectories in China’s Quest for Sovereignty on Digital Communication Infrastructures

This seminar traces China’s evolution vis-à-vis digital communication infrastructures, with a particular focus on the Internet and cellular networks. The discussion will focus on the Chinese government and Chinese companies, whether private or state-owned, and their own policy choices, which overlapped or clashed at different times in history. The discussion will cover Chinese actors’ engagement in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), where Internet standards are made; in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which supervises the distribution of the Internet’s critical resources (unique identifiers); and in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project and the O-RAN Alliance, where cellular networks are standardised. To conduct this discussion, Riccardo Nanni will depart from his book Rising China and Internet Governance. Multistakeholderism, Fragmentation and the Liberal Order in the Age of Digital Sovereignty (Palgrave Macmillan, 2024) and illustrate his current research activities.

Tuesday 13th January 2026 (10h30-12h30)
Room C. Jauffret-Spinosi – IDC, 28 rue Saint-Guillaume, 75007 Paris

Anne Bellon (Université de Technologie de Compiègne):

Le gouvernement américain contre le monopole des plateformes. Ethnographie des procès de la Tech

Entre 2020 et 2025, la politique antitrust des Etats-Unis a connu d’importants bouleversements et une révision de ses principes d’intervention. Les procès du gouvernement américain contre les géants du net, notamment Google et Meta, sont emblématiques de ce nouvel activisme institutionnel porté par les dirigeants de la Federal Trade Commission (FTC) et du Department of Justice. Cette communication étudie les conditions de possibilités d’un tel renversement et la manière dont les agences de régulation ont cherché à limiter le pouvoir des grands monopoles numériques.

Tuesday 18th March 2026 (10h30-12h30)
Room C. Jauffret-Spinosi – IDC, 28 rue Saint-Guillaume, 75007 Paris

Alison Harcourt (University of Exeter):

Brexit and Digital Sovereignty

The UK’s approach to digital markets is best characterised as a reactive and adaptive policy style reflecting a ‘legislatively light’ and ‘pro-innovation’ strategy whereas the EU’s has become increasingly anticipatory and impositional, reflecting a shift away from its historical liberal market orientation one more rooted in a Coordinated Market Economy model. This shift is particularly evident in the EU’s embrace of ‘digital sovereignty’, which prioritizes the development of European champions and control over critical technologies. Brexit severed the UK’s long-standing ties with European regulatory networks, halting the exchange of insights and experiences with EU counterparts. Conservative Ministers were often wary of maintaining any residual connections, viewing them as signs of anti-Brexit sentiment, or even potential subversion (Sutherland, 2025:8). Without the support of fellow member states and the European Commission, UK agencies and regulators became more vulnerable to political pressure. They could no longer rely on EU norms as a shield, as mechanisms like infringement proceedings and peer scrutiny had disappeared. As a result, both regulators and government officials became more exposed to lobbying efforts and were more easily influenced by powerful industry actors. As a result, the UK’s strategy is defined by an increase in dependency in partnerships with major US tech corporations. Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with companies like OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google Cloud highlight a strategic reliance on US investment and technology to secure UK advance in digital innovation. This approach leaves the UK vulnerable to the geopolitical and commercial interests of US firms, a dependency that has drawn academic criticism and arguably signalling a loss of digital sovereignty (Rikap et al, 2024). However, this position has changed under the Labour government, which has adopted a pragmatic and cooperative approach to EU relations. Notable examples are the conclusion of technical negotiations in October 2024 on the UK–EU Competition Cooperation Agreement (CCA) and the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill which mirrors the EU’s NIS 2 Directive. This new ‘reset’ with the EU seeks to manage this divergence through diplomatic and technical tools to ensure continued digital trade openness. The 2025 UK Trade Strategy, aims to find ‘the right diplomatic and technical tools to secure digital trade openness’ implying the use of both formal and informal channels of engagement. A part of this is the establishment of the 2025 UK Soft Power Council. The presentation examines how the current UK Labour administration intends to ‘reset’ its relationship with and potentially expand its influence within the EU. It argues that UK is not just rejoining EU policy but actively seeking to influence it through informal channels and differentiated cooperation. The presentation will examine the effect of this new approach on the digital sovereignty agendas within the UK and EU. 

Tuesday 20th May 2026 (10h30-12h30)
Room C. Jauffret-Spinosi – IDC, 28 rue Saint-Guillaume, 75007 Paris

Tetyana Lokot (Dublin City University):

From Internet Freedom to Digital Sovereignty: the Politics of Global Norm Contestation

Our research examines how and why the norm of internet freedom has changed over time and the global politics of its promotion and contestation. While the global norm of internet freedom has become widely accepted, we analyse how its component parts have been continually contested by actors with changing degrees of power and influence, including states, civil society, corporations, and tech experts. While multistakeholderism, rooted in the normative acceptance of internet freedom, became a core feature of modern internet governance, the perception of growing threats to the open internet has led to nation-states reasserting control over the meaning and limits of a “free internet”, while also navigating the challenges posed by the global influence of technological corporations. Many countries are now advocating for increased state power in the digital domain and adopting measures to strengthen their digital sovereignty. Making a unique contribution by connecting the debates around internet freedom and digital sovereignty, we draw upon the constructivist IR theory of norm contestation and scholarship on cyber norms and consider to what extent uncertainty around the role of state intervention has motivated the shift from conversations about internet freedom as an established norm to debates about digital sovereignty. Analysing statements and debates by states and international bodies in key global and regional fora and tracing the process of norm contestation in these spaces, we ask whether digital sovereignty is, in fact, emerging as a new global norm – one that overlaps with, but also co-opts the idea of internet freedom to legitimise potentially problematic state practices, restrictions and policies. We examine how this more “promising” normative framework, responding to fears provoked by the perception of the waning democratic potential of the free and open internet, may instead cement state interventionist power, empowering states to make decisions that may not be for the global good.